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LEGAL PRECEDENT AND THE OPPORTUNITY FOR
EDUCATIONAL EQUITY: WHERE TO NOW,
COLORADO?
Molly A. Hunter *
Kathleen J. Gebhardt **
INTRODUCTION
Since the 1600s in New England and at least the late 1700s
more broadly, colonies, states, and the U.S. Congress have recog-
nized the importance of educational opportunity to prepare chil-
dren for the responsibilities of citizenship and the challenges of
changing times.' While a Massachusetts court decided the first
litigation for fair school funding in 1819,2 the modern era of these
cases began with decisions in California, New Jersey, and the
U.S. Supreme Court in the early 1970s.3 An attempt to rely on
federal equal protection for funding equity in San Antonio Inde-
pendent School District v. Rodriguez led to the 1973 U.S. Su-
preme Court decision declaring that education is not a fundamen-
tal right under the federal Constitution.4
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•* Executive Director, Children's Voices in Colorado; Plaintiffs' Lead Counsel in Lo-
bato v. State of Colorado and Dwyer v. State of Colorado.
The authors thank Courtney B. Warren, Associate at Bryan Cave LLP, for research
essential to this article.
1. See generally INST. FOR EDUC. EQUITY & OPPORTUNITY, EDUCATION IN THE 50
STATES: A DESKBOOK OF THE HISTORY OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND LAWS ABOUT
EDUCATION (2008).
2. Commonwealth v. Dedham was the first education finance case decided by the Su-
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. The court held that schools must "be maintained
for the benefit of the whole town, as it is the wise policy of the law to give all the inhabit-
ants equal privileges, for the education of their children in the public schools. Nor is it in
the power of the majority to deprive the minority of this privilege." Commonwealth v.
Dedham, 16 Mass. (16 Tyng) 141, 146 (1819).
3. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 4 (1973); Serrano v. Priest,
487 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Cal. 1971); Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 276 (N.J. 1973).
4. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 37.
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Heeding the advice of Justice Thurgood Marshall in his dis-
sent, the Rodriguez plaintiffs turned to the Texas Constitution
and state courts, and won.' Since Rodriguez, plaintiffs in forty-
five states have challenged school funding formulas primarily in
state courts, usually suing the state under the state's constitu-
tional education articles.6
Each of the fifty state constitutions requires the state to pro-
vide education.7 To interpret these education articles, the courts
rely on state constitutional history, which often declares educa-
tion essential to protect democracy, a republican form of govern-
ment, and individual rights.'
Since 1989, plaintiffs have won about two-thirds of these edu-
cational opportunity cases.9 Though defendant states often pre-
vailed in the 1970s and 1980s in cases based on equal protection
clauses and seeking equal per-pupil funding,"° plaintiffs' success
rate improved as they focused more on ensuring that schools had
sufficient resources to educate all students, relying on state con-
stitutional education articles.1 According to the Education Law
5. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. 1989).
6. Molly A. Hunter, Requiring States to Offer a Quality Education to All Students,
A.B.A. HUM. RTS., Fall 2005, at 10, 10-12.
7. MOLLY A. HUNTER, EDUC. LAW CTR., STATE CONSTITUTION EDUCATION CLAUSE
LANGUAGE (2011), http://pabarcrc.org/pdf/Molly%2OHunter%2OArticle.pdf (noting that
Washington D.C.'s charter does not include the right to education).
8. See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 205-08 (Ky. 1989);
McDuffy v. Sec'y of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 523-37 (Mass. 1993); Robinson, 303 A.2d at
291-95; Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 801 N.E.2d 326, 330-32 (N.Y. 2003);
Campbell Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1257-58 (Wyo. 1995).
9. Litigation in the States, EDUC. L. CTR., http://www.edlawcenter.org/cases/litigati
on-in-the-states.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2016).
10. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 164 (Ga. 1981) (emphasis added)
(holding that the constitution requires the General Assembly "to provide funds for an ade-
quate education," but not "to equalize educational opportunities"); Hornbeck v. Somerset
Cty. Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758, 776 (Md. 1983) (noting that the "thorough and efficient"
clause commands only that the legislature provide the students of the state with a "basic
public school education," not uniformity in per-pupil funding); Levittown Union Free Sch.
Dist. v. Nyquist 439 N.E.2d 359, 368-69 (N.Y. 1982) (noting constitutional provisions for
"the maintenance and support of a system of free common schools" contemplates the op-
portunity to obtain a sound basic education, not equal per-pupil funding).
11. See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 368-69 (N.J. 1990) (quoting Robinson,
303 A.2d at 295) (holding that a constitutionally required "thorough and efficient" system
will provide an "equal educational opportunity for children" enabling each to become "a
citizen and.., a competitor in the labor market"); Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 801 N.E.2d
at 327-28 (distinguishing an earlier equal protection case); Campbell, 907 P.2d at 1259
(asserting that the education article was intended as a mandate to the Wyoming legisla-
ture to provide students a uniform opportunity to become equipped for their future as par-
ticipants in the political system and competitors both economically and intellectually).
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Center, "[iln response to these court orders, states have adopted
better school funding systems, instituted high quality pre-K pro-
grams, mounted major school facilities programs, and enacted
other remedies.
1 2
In Colorado, however, recent opinions in school funding and
educational opportunity cases raise the question of whether the
Colorado Supreme Court has become an exception among state
high courts that recognize students' right to education enshrined
in the state constitutions.3 To address this question, this article
examines the many Colorado cases involving education finance
and analyzes the state supreme court's interpretations of both the
Education Clause and the Local Control Clause. It also appraises
the court's treatment of cases brought under related, more recent
constitutional amendments. Certain opportunities and barriers
that this precedent has created emerge in this article, which con-
cludes by suggesting potential avenues future legal advocacy
could take toward ensuring fairer educational funding and better
opportunities for Colorado's school children.
I. THE COLORADO CONSTITUTION
During its formation as a state, Colorado placed a great deal of
importance on education, and in 1876 voters overwhelmingly rati-
fied Article IX, a section of the state constitution completely dedi-
cated to education.4 There are two main provisions within Article
IX that have been the focus of education finance litigation in the
state: the Education Clause and the Local Control Clause.
12. Litigation in the States, supra note 9; see, e.g., Abbott v. Burke, 710 A.2d 450, 462-
63 (N.J. 1998) (summarizing the successful high quality preschool program); Campbell
Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 181 P.3d 43, 48 (Wyo. 2008) (examining the state's movement to a
constitutional funding system). See generally Molly A. Hunter, Building on Judicial Inter-
vention: The Redesign of School Facilities Funding in Arizona, 34 J.L. & EDUC. 173 (2005)
(reporting on major facilities funding for construction and renovations in response to the
cases Roosevelt Elementary School District v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806 (Ariz. 1994), and Hull
v. Albrecht, 950 P.2d 1141 (Ariz. 1997)).
13. See generally Dwyer v. State, 357 P.3d 185 (Colo. 2015) (determining that a school
funding plan that reduced total education funding did not violate a voter-adopted constitu-
tional mandate to increase base state funding); Lobato v. State, 304 P.3d 1132 (Colo. 2013)
(holding that the state school funding system did not violate the state constitution's educa-
tion article and yet ignoring, according to Justice Hobbs and Chief Justice Bender in dis-
sent, the extensive trial record, which demonstrated that the finance scheme systematical-
ly maintains educational deficiencies and disparities).
14. See Tom I. Romero, II, "Of Greater Value Than the Gold of Our Mountains": The
Right to Education in Colorado's Nineteenth-Century Constitution, 83 U. COLO. L. REV.
781, 831-36 (2012) [hereinafter Romero, Greater Value Than the Gold].
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The Education Clause, section 2, states:
The general assembly shall, as soon as practicable, provide for the
establishment and maintenance of a thorough and uniform system of
free public schools throughout the state, wherein all residents of the
state, between the ages of six and twenty-one years, may be educat-
ed gratuitously. One or more public schools shall be maintained in
each school district within the state, at least three months in each
year; any school district failing to have such school shall not be enti-
tled to receive any portion of the school fund for that year.
Delegates to the Constitutional Convention, drafting a consti-
tution in order to be accepted as a new state in the United States,
discussed and adopted this clause-the "thorough and uniform"
language in particular-to establish "a qualitative element in the
state's education clause that continued a course of action that had
animated the region from almost the inception of its territorial
days."6
The delegates to the Constitutional Convention also estab-
lished the commitment to local control. After expressing concerns
about the trustworthiness of state-level decision making, "the
delegates chose to confer responsibility for instruction and curric-
ulum (including textbooks) on the local school districts" and to
delegate to the state board of education the 'general supervision'
of the public schools."" With its adoption of the local control pro-
vision, "Colorado became only the second state... with an ex-
press constitutional local control requirement," and is one of only
six today.8
The Local Control Clause, section 15, states:
The general assembly shall, by law, provide for organization of
school districts of convenient size, in each of which shall be estab-
lished a board of education, to consist of three or more directors to be
elected by the qualified electors of the district. Said directors shall
have control of instruction in the public schools of their respective
districts. 9
15. COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2.
16. See Romero, Greater Value Than the Gold, supra note 14, at 833-34.
17. See id. at 835.
18. Id. at 834-36 (stating that Colorado followed Kansas in adopting a constitutional
local control provision). The other four states with a constitutionally mandated local con-
trol provision include Florida, Georgia, Maine, and Montana. See FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 4
(a)-(b); GA. CONST. art. VIII, § V, 1 1; ME. CONST. art. 8, pt. 1, § 1; MONT. CONST. art. X, §
8.
19. COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 15.
[Vol. 50:893
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In 1982, the voters in Colorado placed the first of several tax
policies in their constitution. Known as the "Gallagher Amend-
ment" (named after its author), this amendment set a ratio of res-
idential property taxes to nonresidential property at 45% residen-
tial to 55% nonresidential.21 At the time, no one could foresee the
rapid growth Colorado was to experience in residential property
values. To maintain the Gallagher ratio after this boom, residen-
tial property assessment rates dropped from 21 mills in 1983 to
7.96 mills in 2003.2 For several years, school districts were able
to "float" their mill levies to maintain a relatively even source of
revenue. In 1992, all of that changed.
In 1992, Colorado voters added another tax policy to their con-
stitution: Article X, section 20, known as the Taxpayer Bill of
Rights ("TABOR")."4 This provision is the most restrictive of its
kind in the country and limits the amount of funding that a tax-
ing authority may collect and retain or expend, including local
governments, school districts, and the state itself.5 In addition,
TABOR requires a vote of the people to add a new tax or change
an existing tax at all levels of government." The TABOR amend-
ment has spawned dozens of cases seeking to interpret its me-
chanics, intent, and impact."
20. See Constitutional Provisions, COLO. DEP'T TREASURY, https://www.colorado.
gov/pacific/treasury/constitutional-provisions-0 (last visited Feb. 19, 2016). The process for
amending the Colorado Constitution is one of the easiest across the country and has led to
more amendments than in all but two other states. COLO. CONSTITUTIONAL PANEL,
FOUNDATION OF A GREAT STATE: THE FUTURE OF COLORADO'S CONSTITUTION 9-12 (2007),
http://www.du.edu/issues/media/documents/ConstitutionReport.pdf; Building a Better
Colorado's Process, BUILDING A BETTER COLO., https:/Ibetterco.org/processindex (last vis.
ited Feb. 19, 2016).
21. Memorandum from Todd Herreid, Chief Fiscal Officer, Colo. Legis. Council Staff,
to the Long-Term Fiscal Stability Comm'n, Colo. Legis. Council Staff 1 (July 7, 2009),
https://www.colorado.govfpacific/sites/defaultlfiles/State%20Constitution%2 0and%2OSchoo
l%20Finance.pdf.
22. Id. at 2.
23. Shrinking Funding for Colorado's Schools: A Timeline of School Finance Legisla-
tion and Consequences, COLO. FIScAL INST., http://www.coloradofiscal.org/wp-content/up
loads/2015/05/school-finance-timeline-CFI.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2016).
24. COLO. CONST. art. X, § 20; see TABOR, COLO. LEGIS. COUNCIL, https://www.colora
do.gov/pacificga-legislativecouncil/tabor (last visited Feb. 19, 2016).
25. Cf. Policy Basics: Taxpayer Bill of Rights (TABOR), CTR. ON BUDGET & POLeY
PRIORITIES (Aug. 13, 2015), http:/Iwww.cbpp.org/researchlstate-budget-and-tax/policy-bas
ics-taxpayer-bill-of-rights-tabor. No other state has adopted TABOR, presumably because
'TABOR forces large, annual cuts to services that families and businesses rely on and that
support state economic prosperity, as Colorado's experience shows." Id.
26. COLO. CONST. art. X, § 20(4)(a).
27. As of 2013, there had been more than forty appellate decisions addressing various
2016]
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To meet the revenue limits of TABOR, the state started requir-
ing school districts to lower their local mills.28 School districts
were faced with the dilemma that, under TABOR, they potential-
ly could not keep any revenue above the limit, including revenue
from concession contracts and non-federal grants." In response to
this requirement, many school districts held "waiver elections"
that would allow them to keep the revenue they collected.30 Be-
tween 1995 and 2006, 175 of the 178 districts voted to waive the
revenue limits.3' However, despite these local votes, the state con-
tinued to require local districts to lower their local mills. 32 That
decision by the state was challenged, in Mesa County Board of
County Commissioners v. State of Colorado.33 The Colorado Su-
preme Court, in Mesa, after a detailed analysis of the state and
local funding system for schools in Colorado, found that the state
did not have the authority to lower the local mills and that the
repeal of the part of the statute that lowered local mills after a
vote did not violate TABOR.34
In November 2000, Colorado voters amended their constitution
a third time to address the negative impacts that both Gallagher
and TABOR had on school funding, and in doing so they clearly
indicated their intent to prioritize K-12 education funding over
competing budgetary demands.3 This amendment ("Amendment
23") became Article IX, section 17, of the Colorado Constitution
and was intended to ensure that education funding first return to
1988 funding levels and then keep up with enrollment increases
and inflation.36
aspects of TABOR. See Peter J. Whitmore, The Taxpayers Bill of Rights-Twenty Years of
Litigation, COLO. L., Sept. 2013, at 35 (describing the leading Colorado appellate court
cases interpreting TABOR since the amendment went into effect).




32. See id. at 525.
33. See generally id. at 526 ('The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief and
a refund of the $117.8 million allegedly collected in violation of Article X, section 20.").
34. Id. at 536.
35. See LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL TO THE COLO. GEN. ASSEMBLY, AN ANALYSIS OF THE
2000 STATEWIDE BALLOT PROPOSALS 9, 46-47 (2000); Shrinking Funding for Colorado's
Schools, supra note 23.
36. Colorado Supreme Court Rejects Funding Increase Claim, NAT'L EDUC. ACCESS
NETWORK, http://schoolfunding.info/2015/09/colorado-supreme-court-rejects-funding-increa
se-claiml (last visited Feb. 19, 2016); see also Complaint, Dwyer v. State, No. 14 Civ. 32543
at 2 (Denv. Dist. Ct. 2014), http://co.chalkbeat.org/sites/defaultfiessites/2/2014/O6/Dwy
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II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SCHOOL FUNDING LITIGATION
A. Early Education Clause Cases
The Colorado Supreme Court first addressed the Education
Clause in 1893, in In re Kindergarten Schools, and affirmatively
answered the question of whether the General Assembly could es-
tablish and maintain kindergarten for children under six years of
age.37 The court also identified the rule of construction to be ap-
plied to the Colorado Constitution, a rule which remains good law
today.38
The court stated that "[u]nless ... the constitution, in express
terms or by necessary implication, limits it, the legislature may
exercise its sovereign power in any way that, in its judgment, will
best subserve the general welfare."39 The court applied the follow-
ing construction to Article IX, section 2, stating that
the section is clearly mandatory, and requires affirmative action on
the part of the legislature to the extent and in the manner specified,
and is in no measure prohibitory or a limitation of its power to pro-
vide free schools for children under six years of age, whenever it
deems it wise and beneficial to do so.
4
0
Holding this section mandatory was a key first step in creating a
right to education in Colorado. However, the court did not ad-
dress the minimum standards actually required by the clause un-
til almost a century later.
The court next considered the Education Clause in Chicago, B.
& Q.R. Co. v. School District No. 1 in Yuma County, interpreting
an Act, the stated purpose of which was "the establishment and
maintenance of a thorough and uniform system of free public
schools throughout the state," as required by the Education
Clause.4' The plaintiff railroad company sued for the return of a
"special school tax" paid by the company pursuant to this Act.42
The company alleged that the Act was one for "raising revenue"
within the meaning of Article V, section 31, and that, because the
er-FINAL-Complaint-6.26.pdf.
37. 32 P. 422, 422-23 (Colo. 1893).
38. Id. at 422.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 423.
41. 165 P. 260, 261 (Colo. 1917).
42. Id. at 261.
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Act originated in the Senate and not the House as required by
that provision, the tax was unconstitutional.3 The Colorado Su-
preme Court disagreed that the tax pursuant to this act was for
"raising revenue," and instead held that it was a general Act; tax-
es were incidental to the main purpose, which was the support
and benefit of a school system, and, therefore, the Act was consti-
tutional.44
B. Early Local Control Precedent-Belier Line of Cases
Starting in 1915 and continuing to this day, the Colorado Su-
preme Court has held that "local control of instruction" is inextri-
cably tied to control over locally raised funds. In Belier v. Wilson,
the court addressed a statute that authorized the county commis-
sioner to levy a tax on property in one district for the support of a
school in another district." The court held that this taxation,
"without giving the electors of the former district any voice in the
selection of those who manage and control the school ... violates,
both in letter and in spirit, article 9, § 15."
The Colorado Supreme Court considered local control and fund-
ing again in School District No. 16 in Adams County v. Union
High School, in which the challenged statute provided that a stu-
dent could attend a high school in a neighboring district if the
sending district had no high school.47 The court held that this leg-
islation violated the Local Control Clause because "[t]he Legisla-
ture [had] . . . clearly interfered with the control of instruction in
such district.48 The court's decision emphasized that "[n]o discre-
tion is left in the board of directors of the district wherein there is
no high school as to the character of high school instruction the
pupils thereof shall receive at the cost of the district. '49 The ra-
tionale behind this rule is that in order for local control to be fully
realized, a district must have some discretion over (1) the educa-
tion of students residing in their district and (2) the education
provided by the funding supplied from within the district.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 262-63.
45. 147 P. 355, 355 (Colo. 1915).
46. Id. at 356.





The Colorado Supreme Court continued this principle of local
control in Hotchkiss v. Montrose County High School District, a
case it held to be indistinguishable from Union High School." The
court held that "the construction therein given to statutes which
purport to confer upon one school district the power to control or
utilize the funds of the other" is unconstitutional under the Local
Control Clause, especially where the school providing the funding
has no discretion over the pupils' education.51 In Hotchkiss the
court stated that it was not concerned with the wisdom of the
statute, only its constitutionality.52
The court first limited the Belier line of cases in Craig v. Peo-
ple, in which it held that the General Assembly may accomplish
inter-district funding by appropriating state funds from the pub-
lic school fund.53 The court held that the state apportionment of
the public school fund, a constitutionally established special fund
based on school population, was constitutional "to supplement lo-
cal taxation for school purposes, thereby decreasing the school tax
burden of the residents thereof.'5 4 The court went on to say that,
so long as the manner of distribution for the public fund is "not
unreasonable, not discriminatory, and not in contravention of
constitutional mandates, it cannot be assailed."55 Thus began the
current system of mixed state and local funding for education in
Colorado, the same system that now exists in forty-nine states.56
C. The Next Phase
In the 1931 case of Duncan v. People, the Colorado Supreme
Court again addressed the mandates of the state's Education
Clause.57 The court held that a local school board's arrangement
for school accommodations in another district, including transpor-
tation as well as the curriculum required, did not satisfy Article
IX, section 2, of the constitution, which states that "one or more
50. 273 P. 652, 652-53 (Colo. 1928).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. 299 P. 1064, 1066-68 (Colo. 1931).
54. Id. at 1067.
55. Id.
56. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., 10 FACTS ABOUT K-12 FUNDING 2 (2005); see Educ. Fin. Sta-
tistics Ctr., State Finance Programs, NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATS. http://nces.ed.gov/ed
fin/statefinancing.asp (last visited Feb. 19, 2016).
57. See Duncan v. People, 299 P. 1060, 1060 (Colo. 1931).
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public schools shall be maintained in each school district within
the state."8 The court interpreted this Clause literally and did not
accept the board's argument that its substantial compliance with
the provision by providing alternative accommodations was suffi-
cient.9
In Wilmore v. Annear, the Colorado Supreme Court dealt with
a challenge to the first direct state support of local schools.6" The
court held that "the establishment and financial maintenance of
the public schools of the state is the carrying out of a state and
not a local or municipal purpose."6' The court further stated that
"there are certain restrictions ... that the general assembly may
not impose on districts or their boards," but that this Act, which
in relevant part apportioned $500 from the general funds of the
state to school districts in proportion to their pupils in average
daily attendance, did not violate any of these restrictions.62
Decades later, in Marshall v. School District Re #3 Morgan
County, a school district brought an action against parents to re-
cover rental fees for books used by their children in their public
school studies.63 The court determined that "it was not the intent
of the framers of our constitution that school districts furnish
books free to all students."64 In holding this, the court cited three
statutes: one passed in 1883 requiring school boards to provide
books to indigent children, one passed in 1887 granting boards of
education the power to provide free textbooks, and one passed in
1964 providing that the boards could charge "reasonable" fees for
textbooks, if necessary.65 In an unusual turn of reasoning, the
Marshall court held that these statutes showed that the constitu-
tional requirement to maintain and establish free schools did not
require schools to provide books for all children.66 Despite the
state constitution's promise of "free public schools," in which all
children are to be "educated gratuitously," here the court held
58. COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2; Duncan, 299 P. at 1060-61.
59. Duncan, 299 P. at 1061.
60. See Wilmore v. Annear, 65 P.2d 1433, 1434-35 (Colo. 1937).
61. Id. at 1437.
62. Id. at 1433-34, 1437.
63. 553 P.2d 784, 784 (Colo. 1976).
64. Id. at 785.
65. Id. at 785-86 (referring to COLO. REV. STAT. § 3046(9) (1883); Act of Apr. 4, 1887,
Colo. Sess. Laws 391-93; Act of Mar. 26, 1964, ch. 73, Colo. Sess. Laws 587).
66. Id. at 784, 786.
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that students could be charged for an essential part of an educa-
tion: textbooks.67
D. Lujan Challenge to Colorado School Finance
In the 1977 case Lujan v. Colorado State Board of Education,
school children from sixteen districts across the state challenged
the Public School Finance Act of 1973 ("PSFA 1973")68 on the
grounds that it violated the equal protection provisions of the
U.S. and Colorado Constitutions, as well as the Colorado Educa-
tion Clause.69 Although the Lujan trial court ruled in favor of the
plaintiffs, ° the Colorado Supreme Court reversed, citing the U.S.
Supreme Court's Rodriguez decision to hold that PSFA 1973 did
not violate the federal Equal Protection Clause.7 ' Also, as did
most state courts ruling in these types of cases, the Colorado Su-
preme Court concluded that the state's equal protection and edu-
cation clauses did not require "absolute equality in educational
services or expenditures.72
The court recognized Lujan as the first time it had "been called
upon to interpret Article IX, section 2 in any context which would
prove helpful to this case"-namely, whether it requires equal
educational funding.3 Interpreting section 2, the court found that
the requirements are satisfied if "thorough and uniform educa-
tional opportunities are available through state action in each
school district," and that the section "does not require that educa-
tional expenditures per pupil in every school district be identi-
cal.7 4
III. MORE CHALLENGES BASED ON LOCAL CONTROL
A. Booth-Lessening Local Control?
In the 1999 case, Board of Education of School District No. 1 v.
Booth, the Colorado Supreme Court ruled on a challenge under
67. Id. at 784-85.
68. Public School Finance Act of 1973, ch. 252, 2006 Colo. Sess. Laws 1075.
69. 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982).
70. See id. at 1010.
71. Id. at 1016 (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-35
(1973)).
72. Id. at 1018-19.
73. Id. at 1024.
74. Id. at 1025.
2016]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
the Colorado Constitution's Local Control provision when it de-
termined the constitutionality of the Charter Schools Act
("CSA").7  The CSA "establishes a process by which individuals or
groups may apply to a local school board for a charter and a pro-
cess for any interested party to appeal ... an adverse decision.""6
The issue in Booth was "whether the General Assembly constitu-
tionally may authorize the State Board of Education to order a lo-
cal school board to approve a charter school application that the
local board has rejected when the State Board finds approval to
be in the best interests of the pupils, school district, or communi-
ty.
,77
The court began its analysis by noting that "[t]he framers' in-
clusion of article IX, section 15 makes Colorado one of only six
states with an express constitutional provision for local govern-
ance, underscoring the importance of the concept to our state.78
The court then stated that although the local board of a school
district has "undeniable constitutional authority," that authority
is subject to limits, which in this case "require[s] balancing the lo-
cal board's interest in exercising control over instruction with the
State Board's interest in asserting its general supervisory author-
ity," something guaranteed in Article IX, section 1(1).71
The Booth court defined the contours of both "general supervi-
sion" and "control of instruction," using plain language definitions
from Webster's Dictionary as a guide.80 In balancing the authority
of the General Assembly, the State Board, and local school
boards, the court held that it "will presume the allocation of au-
thority is valid unless it clearly impedes the capacity of either the
State Board or a local board to exercise its independent constitu-
tional authority."'"
The court concluded that the provision allowing the State
Board to order a local board to approve an application for a char-
ter school does not impede the locality's capacity for local control
because the order will just serve as the basis for the contract for
75. Bd. of Educ. v. Booth, 984 P.2d 639, 642 (Colo. 1999); see COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-
30.5-101 (2013).
76. Booth, 984 P.2d at 642 (citation omitted).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 646.
79. Id.; see COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 1(1).
80. Booth, 984 P.2d at 646-48.
81. Id. at 650.
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the charter school, and the local board still has the authority to
negotiate and resolve issues with charter applicants on its own.82
Therefore, the Booth court held that the CSA provision allowing
appeals to the State Board is constitutional.3
B. Owens, Local Control Violated by a Voucher Statute
Five years later, in Owens v. Colorado Congress of Parents,
Teachers, and Students, the court considered whether a voucher
statute violated the constitution's local control provision.4
Known as the Colorado Opportunity Contract Pilot Program, the
statute was "designed to meet the 'educational needs of high-
poverty, low-achieving children in [Colorado's] highest-poverty
public schools."'5 The parents of a child who qualified would re-
ceive four "assistance payments" each year from the school dis-
trict where the child was enrolled for a private school education.86
Opponents of the statute challenged it by saying that it violated
the Colorado constitution's local control provision.87
The court found that "article IX, section 15 creates and re-
quires a structure of school governance that has remained un-
changed since statehood despite ... changes in school funding,
and the Pilot Program does not comport with this constitutional
structure."88 The court stressed the importance of this section to
the framers of the constitution, arising from their distrust of the
political character of the State Board, and indicated that the pur-
pose of local control is to place control as near to the people as
possible.89
The court then analyzed the case law regarding local control,
particularly the Belier line of cases, Lujan and Booth, and con-
cluded that the Belier line consistently held that "control over lo-
cally raised funds is essential to effectuating the constitutional
requirement of local control over instruction."9 Further, the court
82. Id. at 654.
83. Id. at 654-55.
84. 92 P.3d 933, 934 (Colo. 2004).
85. Id. at 936 (alteration in original) (quoting COLO. REV. STAT § 22-56-102(1)(a)
(2003)).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 934.
88. Id. at 935.
89. Id. at 935-36.
90. See id. at 939-42.
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recognized that "[in] the Belier era, [it] scrupulously honored the
framers' preference, as expressed in article IX, section 15, for lo-
cal over state control of instruction, even in the face of legislative
efforts to address serious shortcomings on the part of local school
districts."9
The court rejected voucher proponents' arguments that this
line of cases no longer applied because state involvement in man-
agement and funding of public schools had become much greater
and school finance and choice had evolved so much.92 "Implicit in
this argument," the court wrote, "is that with greater state fund-
ing comes greater state control over educational policy. This court
has long recognized, however, that the constitutional division of
power between state and local boards is not measured by [state]
funding."93 Over the years, the court adhered to the principle that
"[c]ontrol over instruction is inextricably linked to control over lo-
cally-raised funds."9
The court distinguished the case at bar from Booth because it
was not trying to balance state and local constitutional authority
in this case.95 Here, unlike in Booth, the local boards did not re-
tain any authority to determine which students were eligible to
participate, the amount of funds to be devoted, or the character of
instruction paid for by those funds.96 Because of this, the court
found that "[t]he Pilot Program deprives the school districts of all
local control of instruction" and accordingly declared it unconsti-
tutional under the local control provision."
IV. RECENT CASES BASED ON THE EDUCATION AND LOCAL
CONTROL CLAUSES AND ON AMENDMENT 23
A. Giardino v. State of Colorado State Board of Education
In 1998, a class action case was filed against the State of Colo-
rado over its method of funding capital construction for K-12
91. Id. at 940.
92. Id. at 940, 943.
93. Id. at 943.
94. Id. at 941.





schools.98 At that time (and still today), the ability of a local school
district to maintain, renovate, or build a new school was almost
completely dependent on local property wealth.99 Colorado simply
has never believed that ensuring safe and secure buildings for its
students was a state responsibility. Thus, until 2008, Colorado
had no idea of the number of school buildings in the state or,
more importantly, the conditions of any of the buildings. °0 Plain-
tiffs in Giardino alleged that the state's finance system for facili-
ties violated the thorough and uniform clause and denied the
equal protection and due process protections contained in the
Colorado Constitution.1"' Giardino proceeded to trial in May
2000.102 After several days of trial, the parties settled for $190
million, which was to be distributed via state financial assistance
programs established as part of the settlement.10 3 In 2008, to re-
place the financing programs created after Giardino, for the first
time the state passed a bill that provided some state support
through a matching grant program.'°M Known as the BEST (Build-
ing Excellent Schools Today) program, it has been successful in
helping to build new schools in some of the poorest regions of the
state; however, it has not come close to meeting the over $13 bil-
lion in need that was identified as part of the BEST program.'
98. Giardino v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., No. 98-CV-0246 (Denv. Dist. Ct. 1998);
see generally Kathleen J. Gebhardt, Challenges to Funding School Facilities in Colorado,
83 NEB. L. REV. 856 (2004-05) (providing "an account of the Giardino litigation ... and the
aftermath of the settlement reached").
99. Gebhardt, supra note 98, at 861.
100. See KORI DONALDSON, COLO. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, BUILDING EXCELLENT
SCHOOLS TODAY (BEST) ACT (Sept. 2011), https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/sites/default/
files/l1-llUpdate%20to%202010%20BEST%20Issue%2OBrief.pdf. The BEST program was
the first time the state had a real obligation to interest itself in school capital construction
and maintenance. Id; see also infra notes 104-05.
101. See Gebhardt, supra note 98, at 862.
102. See id. at 865-66.
103. DONALDSON, supra note 100; Gebhardt, supra note 98, at 865-66.
104. COLO. DEPT OF EDUC., Div. OF CAPITAL CONSTR., BUILDING EXCELLENT SCHOOLS
TODAY (BEST) 6, 11, http://www.cde.state.co.us/cdefinance/bestgrantprogramoverview;
DONALDSON, supra note 100.
105. See Editorial, Audit Shows Colorado Falling Short on School Repairs, DENV. POST
(Oct. 9, 2013), http://www.denverpost.com/editorials/ci_24276151/audit-shows-colorado-fall
ing-short-school-repairs; Matt Samelson, Voices: Uncertain Future for Building Funds,
CHALKBEAT COLO. (July 26, 2012, 7:05 AM), http://co.chalkbeat.org/2012/07/26/comment
ary-saving-283-million-for-schools-capital-needst#.Vqq7gMclfwc.
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B. Lobato v. State of Colorado ("Lobato I")
In 2005, plaintiffs challenged the overall adequacy of funding
under the Public School Finance Act of 1994 ("PSFA") in Lobato v.
State of Colorado and alleged that the overall funding system vio-
lated both the education clause and the local control of instruc-
tion clause."6 The trial court initially dismissed the case, finding
it non-justiciable.107 The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed, but
in 2009, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed both lower courts'
decisions and remanded the case for trial.0 8 Significantly, the Su-
preme Court found:
[T]he plaintiffs must be provided the opportunity to prove their alle-
gations. To be successful, they must prove that the state's current
public school financing system is not rationally related to the ...
constitutional mandate to provide a "thorough and uniform" system
of public education .... [The trial court] may appropriately rely on
the legislature's own pronouncements [to develop] the meaning of a
"thorough and uniform" system of education.1
9
In August and September 2011, a five-week trial was conduct-
ed pursuant to the remand."0 The trial court heard testimony
from plaintiff and defendant witnesses from the Colorado De-
partment of Education ("CDE"), superintendents of Colorado
school districts, nationally respected researchers, and others, who
all presented numerous relevant exhibits."' The trial covered, in-
ter alia, testimony on "special student populations," including
gifted and talented students, Colorado's early childhood popula-
tion, students with disabilities, and English language learner
("ELL") students."2 In examining the school funding system and
further developing the meaning of the Education Clause, the
court relied on the legislature's own statements and laws setting
106. Lobato v. State, 216 P.3d 29, 32-33 (Colo. App. 2008); see Public School Finance
Act of 1994 (PSFA), COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-54-101 (1994).
107. Lobato, 216 P.3d at 33.
108. Id. at 42, rev'd and remanded by Lobato v. State (Lobato 1), 218 P.3d 358, 363-64,
376 (Colo. 2009) (en banc).
109. Lobato I, 218 P.3d at 363.
110. See Todd Engdahl, High Court Reverses Lobato Ruling, CHALKBEAT COLO. (May
28, 2013, 12:22 PM), http://co.chalkbeat.org/2013/05/28/high-court-reverses-lobato-ruling#.
Vqq5bsclfwc (discussing the 2011 trial that followed the 2009 remand).
111. Lobato v. State, No. 2005CV4794, 2011 WL 10960207, at *39-54 (Deny. Dist. Ct.
Dec. 9, 2011) (Trial Order).
112. Id. at *26, 57, 72, 79.
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out the state's standards-based education requirements and ac-
countability measures."3 One brief summary is illustrative.
1. Court Findings: ELL Students
The data available at the 2011 trial, usually from the 2008-09
school year, showed that Colorado had over 100,000 ELL students
in grades K-12, representing 12% of the student population, who
were being served in most school districts.' Colorado law re-
quires districts to identify, track, and annually assess ELL stu-
dents and to implement a research-based program to serve
them."5 Bringing all ELL students in Colorado up to legislatively
mandated proficiency levels "requires comprehensive programs
across many grade levels; in-school and out-of-school experiences,
trained teachers, a good curriculum, instructional materials, and
good parent involvement," in the words of the court."6
Achievement test scores of Colorado Limited English Proficient
students in reading, writing, and mathematics are significantly
lower than average scores statewide."7 The graduation rate of
ELL students in Colorado for the year 2009 was 53%, as com-
pared to the state average graduation rate of 75%."' The court
found that the Colorado English Language Proficiency Act pro-
vides
insufficient funding in Colorado to provide the types of effective in-
structional and support programs for ELLs mandated by [federal
law], supported by research, and recommended by [the Colorado De-
partment of Education] in its own guidebook. ... State funds barely
cover the costs of administering the [annual] Colorado English Lan-
guage Assessment (CELA) test." 1
9
According to the court, the evidence showed that the funding level
provided for ELLs bears "no relationship" to the cost of meeting
the state's own standards and requirements, as delineated in the
120legislature's own pronouncements.
113. Id. at *9-11.
114. Id. at *79.
115. Id.
116. Id. at *83.
117. Id. at *82-83.
118. Id. at *83.
119. Id. at *81.
120. Id.
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2. Undisputed: No Rational Relationship
After hearing all the evidence on these and many other educa-
tional matters, the trial court issued a hefty 156-page opinion,
stating its findings and conclusions. The court summarized the
standards-based education system and the funding system that
the legislature put in place in 1994, and from that starting point
made clear that these two systems-education and education fi-
nance-"which were not aligned to begin with, have radically di-
verged. 12'
The court also described the "deplorable conditions of numer-
ous rural schools" and weak funding of categorical programs, and
it concluded that "the entire system of public school finance... is
not rationally related to the mandate of the Education Clause" of
the Colorado Constitution.'22 The court further explained that the
state had identified the "standard and measure of the education
to be provided," but its funding system nevertheless failed to "de-
termine the resources needed to accomplish that [level of educa-
tion]," and subsequently did not "fund ... the necessary re-
sources."
123
In ruling that the Colorado school finance system violated both
the rights of the individual plaintiffs and the Colorado Constitu-
tion, the court wrote: "The Plaintiffs have proved, indeed, it is es-
sentially undisputed, that the PSFA bears no rational relation-
ship to providing funding sufficient to successfully implement the
standards-based education system developed by the General As-
sembly."'24 The court concluded that, "[iun short, the PSFA has
never been adjusted to address the costs associated with
the progressive implementation of the standards-based education
and education accountability systems," and further that "Colora-
do public school children are not receiving the thorough and uni-
form educational opportunities mandate[d] by the Education
Clause."''
As a remedy, the court called for a rational and sufficient fund-
ing system, ordering the state defendants "to design, enact, fund,
121. Id. at*149.
122. Id. at *150.
123. Id. at *149.
124. Id. at *150.
125. Id. at *149, 153.
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and implement a system of public school finance that provides
and assures that adequate, necessary, and sufficient funds are
available in a manner rationally related to accomplish the pur-
poses of the Education Clause and the Local Control Clause.'
26
Nonetheless, the court stayed this order while the case was on
appeal.'
27
C. Return to the Supreme Court: Lobato v. State of Colorado
("Lobato II")
After the Lobato I ruling, it is important to note that the com-
position of the Colorado Supreme Court changed.1 2' Two of the
justices in the majority left the court.'29 One of the new appointees
to the court recused herself from the Lobato II decision because
she had previously worked on the case.12 0
On appeal from the trial court's ruling, the supreme court re-
versed without citing to a single finding in the extensive trial
court record.'3' Ignoring the Lobato I court's guidance that the leg-
islature's own pronouncements on public education could be re-
lied upon at trial,'32 the supreme court instead turned to Web-
ster's Dictionary to define the Education Clause.3' The court
defined "thorough and uniform" as complete, comprehensive, and
consistent across the state.' The court, dismissing the entire tri-
al record and trial court opinion in one short paragraph, held that
the state school financing system was "rationally related to the
'thorough and uniform' mandate," claiming that the system of
126. Id. at*156.
127. Id.
128. See Felisa Cardona, Ritter Picks Monica Marquez for Colorado Supreme Court,
DENY. POST (Sept. 9, 2010, 11:34 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/ci_16027263; Zachary
Willis, District Court Judge Brian Boatright Appointed to the Colorado Supreme Court,
CBA CLE LEGAL CONNECTION (Oct. 27, 2011), http://cbaclelegalconnection.com/2011/10/
rado-district-court-judge-brian-boatright-appointed-to-the-colosupreme -court/.
129. See Cardona, supra note 128; Willis, supra note 128.
130. Tim Hoover & Kevin Simpson, Colorado Supreme Court Justices Offer Strong Re-
actions in Lobato Case, DENy. POST (Mar. 7, 2013, 10:45 AM), http://www.denverpost.
com/ci_22738785/colorados-high-court-hears-school-funding-lawsuit-arguments.
131. Lobato v. State (Lobato I1), 304 P.3d 1132, 1136-37 (Colo. 2013).
132. Lobato v. State (Lobato 1), 218 P.3d 358, 375 (Colo. 2009) (en banc); see also infra
note 144 (discussing the Washington Supreme Court defining education in the context of
legislation).
133. LobatoII, 304 P.3dat 1139.
134. Id.
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public schools was complete, comprehensive, and consistent
across the state.
135
Then, setting the bar at the lowest constitutional standard in
the country, the court cited the 19th century relic in the Educa-
tion Clause that requires .'[o]ne or more public schools' be
open 'at least three months in each year' in each school district
.... ,,136 This anachronistic requirement, the court wrote, "also
supports our interpretation of the phrase 'thorough and uni-
form."'1 31 Shockingly, the court stated that this outmoded phrase,
"together with the 'thorough and uniform' mandate, simply estab-
lishes the constitutional floor upon which the General Assembly
must build its education policy.'
138
In a strongly worded dissent, the Chief Justice wrote, "today,
the majority abdicates this court's responsibility to give meaning-
ful effect to the Education Clause's guarantee that all Colorado
students receive a thorough and uniform education.'' 39 His dis-
sent reviewed the evidence presented at trial, the trial court's
findings of fact, and its conclusions of law to support his opin-
ion.
140
In an additional dissenting opinion, Justice Hobbs wrote that
based on the extensive trial record in this case, the current finance
scheme for public school education through the twelfth grade does
not promote a "thorough and uniform" system, contrary to the Edu-
cation Clause. Instead, the currently unbalanced system of school fi-
nance systematically maintains and exacerbates educational defi-
ciencies-leaving our public school system "so crippled by
underfunding and so marked by gross disparities among districts
that access to educational opportunities is determined not by a stu-
dent's interests or abilities but by where he or she happens to
live." ''
The court majority also held that the finance system did not vi-
olate the Local Control Clause of the Colorado Constitution based
on the requirement that the local board retain discretion, com-
menting that "local 'control over instruction is inextricably linked
135. Id. at 1140.
136. Id. at 1139.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1144 (Bender, C.J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 1144-48.
141. Id. at 1152 (Hobbs, J., dissenting).
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to control over locally-raised funds."'42 The court held that the fi-
nance system complies with the Local Control Clause because lo-
cal districts retain "responsibility for imposing, collecting, and
expending local property taxes collected for education purpos-
es."'43 Overall, the Supreme Court failed to uphold the educational
rights of Colorado's children and left them without the power of
the constitution to guide the state in providing what other state
courts have found to be substantive rights to an adequate educa-
tion. 144
D. Dwyer v. State of Colorado
In 2015, the Colorado Supreme Court addressed a narrower
challenge to school finance in Dwyer v. State of Colorado.'45 This
challenge arose out of Amendment 23. '46 During the Great Reces-
sion, Colorado cut close to $1 billion from education funding per
year.'47 To keep track of the cuts, the legislature implemented the
so-called "negative factor."'4 s The Dwyer plaintiffs challenged the
constitutionality of the "negative factor," particularly whether it
violated Amendment 23.149
142. Id. at 1143 (majority opinion).
143. Id.
144. Particularly striking in the same time frame as the Lobato cases are decisions
from the Washington Supreme Court and the Kansas Supreme Court. The Washington
Supreme Court defined education in the context of legislative enactments, and after re-
viewing the extensive trial court record, held that "the 'education' required under [the con-
stitution] consists of the opportunity to obtain the knowledge and skills described" in prior
case law and legislative statutes. McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227, 251 (Wash. 2012). The
court then analyzed whether the legislature was providing the necessary funding and held
that the "basic education funding formulas.., did not correlate to the level of resources
needed to provide all students with an opportunity to meet the State's education stand-
ards." Id. at 253. Similarly, in Kansas, after an extensive trial with similar findings to Lo-
bato, the Kansas Supreme Court found the state finance system unconstitutional. Gannon
v. State, 319 P.3d 1196, 1203-04 (Kan. 2014) (per curiam). The facts of these three cases
(McCleary, Gannon, and Lobato) were remarkably similar. It is a challenge to understand
the disparate Colorado court decision.
145. 357 P.3d 185, 187 (Colo. 2015).
146. See COLO. CONST. art. IX, §17; see also supra notes 35-36 and associated discus-
sion of Amendment 23.
147. Yesenia Robles & John Frank, Colorado's Education Formula That Cuts Funding
Ruled Constitutional, DENV. POST (Sept. 21, 2015, 9:48 AM), http://www.denverpost.con
news/ci_28851256/colorados-education-formula-that-cuts-funding-ruled-constitutional.
148. Nicholas Garcia, Denver Court Rejects State's Request to Toss Negative Factor
Lawsuit, CHALKBEAT COLO. (Nov. 12, 2014, 5:18 PM), http:/Ico.chalkbeat.org/2014/11/12/
denver-court-rej ects-states-request-to-toss-negative-factr-lawsuit#.VqfvKcrNQqd.
149. Dwyer, 357 P.3d at 188.
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The trial court denied the state's Motion to Dismiss, ruling that
Amendment 23 required increases in education funding.5 ' How-
ever, the Colorado Supreme Court, in an unusual procedural ap-
proach, heard the case and without any factual record, dismissed
the case in its entirety."1 It should be noted that the Lobato I
court, when writing about Amendment 23, found that "[w]hen
construing a constitutional amendment, the duty of the court is to
'give effect to the electorate's intent in enacting the amend-
ment.""'2 The Lobato I court went on to hold that "Amendment 23
prescribes minimum increases for state funding of education."3
The Dwyer court, however, held that the negative factor does
not violate Amendment 23, which "only requires increases to
statewide base per pupil funding, not total per pupil funding.""11
4
By contrast, the negative factor affects total per-pupil funding by
operating as a factor in the formula for the total."' The court re-
jected the argument that because the negative factor reduces eve-
ry district's funding by the same percentage and is not based on
individual district characteristics, it cuts the base funding."6 The
court wrote that this contention is incompatible with the plain
language of Amendment 23 and the statute."1
7
Since the Lobato and Dwyer rulings, Colorado's school funding
has continued to fall with no end in sight.15' The negative factor
has continued to increase."' All of the facts identified as educa-
tional inadequacies in the Lobato trial court opinion have wors-
ened, and many students are denied their right to a constitution-
ally adequate education.6 ' Dwyer is an example of the court
backing away from a constitutional provision intended to require
150. Id. at 187.
151. Id. at 193.
152. Lobato v. State (Lobato 1), 218 P.3d 358, 375 (Colo. 2009).
153. Id. at 376.
154. Dwyer, 357 P.3d at 191, 193.
155. Id. at 190.
156. Id. at 192.
157. Id. at 192-93.
158. John Frank, Colorado Budget 2017: $373 Million in Reduced Spending, Refunds,
DENV. POST (Nov. 2, 2015, 5:13 PM), http://www.denverpost.comlnewsIci_29061187/hicken
looper-outlines-proposed-state-budget-cuts-27-billion; Robles & Frank, supra note 147.
159. See Amendment 23 FAQS, GREATEDUCATION COLO., http://www.greateducation.
orglstatistics-faqs/funding-faqs/amendment-23/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2016).
160. See Yesenia Robles, Colorado School Funding Disparities on Rise, Educators Call




better funding, when Colorado's education funding was already
some of the most dismal in the country."' If the court continues to
follow these recent precedents, it will be very difficult to achieve
meaningful education finance reform through the courts.
CONCLUSION
Colorado courts have heard claims under the state constitu-
tion's education article for over a century. With its recent Lobato
H decision, however, the Colorado Supreme Court has erected
new challenges that must be overcome to vindicate children's con-
stitutional rights in the courts. While the Lobato H court did not
overturn Lobato I or Lujan and did not declare the claims non-
justiciable, as a handful of state high courts have done,"' a more
thorough court would need to articulate a modern, standards-
based constitutional standard to recognize and defend the right to
an educational opportunity that is meaningful in the 21st century
for Colorado's children.
In Lujan, the court held that the requirement of a "thorough
and uniform system of free public schools" is satisfied when
"thorough and uniform educational opportunities are available
through state action in each school district.""16 Also, in Lobato I,
the court held, unsurprisingly, that "plaintiffs are entitled to the
opportunity to prove their allegations."'64 These precedents are
still good law. Moreover, the court's remand in Lobato I framed
plaintiffs' burden as: "To be successful, they must demonstrate
that the school finance scheme is not rationally related to the
constitutional mandate of a 'thorough and uniform' system of
public education."'65 And the instructions to the trial court were
grounded and clear: "The trial court may appropriately rely on
161. These decisions are even more discouraging when considered in the context of the
strong research that shows that there is a significant causal relationship between in-
creased school funding in response to court rulings and improvements in long-term educa-
tional outcomes, especially for economically disadvantaged students. See C. Kirabo Jack-
son et al., The Effect of School Finance Reforms on the Distribution of Spending, Academic
Achievement, and Adult Outcomes 3-5 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 20118, 2014).
162. See, e.g., Bonner v. Daniels, 907 N.E.2d 516, 518 (Ind. 2009); City of Pawtucket v.
Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 58 (R.I. 1995).
163. Lujan v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1017, 1025 (Colo. 1982).
164. Lobato v. State (Lobato 1), 218 P.3d 358, 374 (Colo. 2009).
165. Id.
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the legislature's own pronouncements to develop the meaning of a
'thorough and uniform' system of education.166
Although the Lobato II court held that "the phrase 'thorough
and uniform'. .. describes a free public school system that is of a
quality marked by completeness, is comprehensive, and is con-
sistent across the state,"'6 7 the court ignored the extensive trial
court record, which documented in detail an educational system
that was incomplete, not comprehensive, and caused inconsisten-
cies across the state.168 The evidence at trial also revealed viola-
tions of state and federal education laws and day-after-day harm
to Colorado's school children, facts the court failed to confront.66
Instead, the Lobato II majority held that the finance system
satisfied the complete, comprehensive, and consistent require-
ments because of the "multi-faceted statutory approach that ap-
plies uniformly to all of the school districts."'7 ° The court held,
without analysis, that the statutory scheme was "rationally relat-
ed" to the "thorough and uniform" constitutional mandate.' In
this manner, the majority rested its opinion on the bones of the
state's educational statutes without acknowledging or examining
the missing meat on the bones, the missing educational resources
due to the state's underfunding, and the gross disparities across
districts that the state has fostered.
Going forward, Coloradans pushing for fair funding and better
opportunities can use the constitutional standards articulated by
the Lujan and Lobato courts in their advocacy. They will likely
compare and contrast the constitutional requirements for "thor-
ough and uniform" and "complete, comprehensive and consistent"
education with the ongoing shortfalls and inequities that are
rampant across the state. In fact, the inadequacies and dispari-
ties continue to grow; Colorado's funding and outcomes are
among the worst in the nation and sinking further.'
166. Id. at 375.
167. Lobato v. State (Lobato I1), 304 P.3d 1132, 1138 (Colo. 2013).
168. See supra Part IV.B-C.
169. See id.
170. Lobato II, 304 P.3d at 1141.
171. Id.
172. See Press Release, Educ. Week, Quality Counts Introduces New State Report
Card: U.S. Earns C, and Massachusetts Ranks First in Nation (Jan. 8, 2015), http:Ilwww.
edweek.org/media/qualitycounts20l5release.pdf; Press Release, Educ. Week, State and
National Grades Issued for Education Performance, Policy; U.S. Earns a C-Plus, Maryland
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At the same time, it will be important for advocates to consider
the barrier that the continuation of TABOR creates, a virtual
stranglehold on securing improvements through the elected
branches of state government. While advocates will build coali-
tions and use grassroots pressure to improve opportunity and ad-
equate programs and services, they may eventually find that they
need to bring another lawsuit under the Education Clause. Tragi-
cally, new plaintiffs could readily show that the Colorado educa-
tion system is not complete or comprehensive and far from "uni-
form" because the state funding system fails to deliver the
resources across districts that all kids need, which has caused
gross disparities in educational outcomes. Advocates can also
hope for the makeup of the court to change.
Children in Colorado should be afforded an adequate educa-
tion, even if the current court has failed to vindicate their rights
under the constitution. Public interest attorneys in Colorado, fol-
lowing precedent in a few other states, can work in a different
type of advocacy role: working with families and others who are
negatively impacted by the court's decision to seek both legisla-
tive and constitutional changes that will protect Colorado's chil-
dren.
Coloradan children's right to a quality education is still their
best hope for being able to lead meaningful and productive lives.
With so much at stake, advocates will pursue every possible ave-
nue to help ensure that future.
Ranks First for Fifth Straight Year (Jan. 10, 2013), http://www.edweek.org/media/Quali
tyCounts2013 Release.pdf.
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